ISSN 2079-9705, Regional Research of Russia, 2019, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1–11. © Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2019.
Russian Text © T.G. Nefedova, A.I. Treivish, 2017, published in Regional'nye Issledovaniya, 2017, No. 2 , pp. 12–23.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Urbanization and Seasonal Deurbanization in Modern Russia[1]

T. G. Nefedova[a], * and A. I. Treivish[a], *

[a] *Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 119017 Russia*

**e-mail: trene12@igras.ru*

Received January 10, 2019; revised January 10, 2019; accepted January 10, 2019

Abstract—The course of urbanization in 20th-century Russia and its specifics during Soviet times and today are considered. To explain the specifics of the urbanization process, the authors put forward five hypotheses, discussing them in detail. The first hypothesis pertains to the inadequacy of Russian statistics. The second depends on the conclusion about the urbanization/deurbanization stage within a territory considered urban (urbanized). The third hypothesis explains the fuzziness of current processes in Russia in terms of their diversity and sometimes the opposite character in various regions and for various population groups. The fourth includes the assumption that resettlement from the provinces to megacities since the 2000s has been replaced by temporary labor migrations of the Russian population to large centers in search of livelihood. The fifth hypothesis holds that the massive involvement of owners of second rural homes, used by city dwellers as dachas during warm months, has created a special type of Russian seasonal dacha suburbanization/deurbanization, slowing down deurbanization typical of developed countries.

Keywords: cities, countryside, urbanization, suburbanization, deurbanization, suburb, periphery, migration to permanent place of residence, temporary labor migrations (seasonal work—*otkhodnichestvo*), dacha

DOI: 10.1134/S2079970519010088

INTRODUCTION

In Soviet Russia, urbanization looked like something obvious and inevitable, but sharp fluctuations in the directions of population migrations at the turn of the 21st century forced reflection on the degree of universality of stadial concepts and the dependence of urbanization on specific national and regional conditions.

The slowing down growth of many Soviet cities back in the late 1980s called attention to stadial schemes [6, 9, 27, 28, 39]. Western authors [22, 26, 30] have long treated urbanization as a series of stages: from population concentration in primate centers to population deconcentration, with concentration prevailing in developing countries and deconcentration predominating in developed countries. In Russia, centripetal shifts clearly weakened, and centrifugal changes arose in the 1980s [3, 35]. By 1990, much remained unclear, but studies on Russia were discontinued for a time. Meanwhile, new models appeared in the West that were commonly termed the theory of differential urbanization, characterized by different dynamics of primate cities, intermediate and small settlements at different stages of urbanization [25, 29].

The *aim of the article* is to show the specifics of urbanization/deurbanization processes in Russia taking into consideration the legacy of Soviet times and further trends. The analysis is based on the authors' studies on sweeping trends in population migrations gleaned from Rosstat statistics and data on massive recurrent cyclic migrations of the Russian population between cities and the countryside.

URBANIZATION IN RUSSIA IN THE 20th CENTURY

Active urbanization in Russia started later than in Western countries: 58% of cities appeared after 1917, and one-third of them, after 1945 [10].

It is impossible to understand the course of the urbanization process without a brief journey into history. In the opinion of B.N. Mironov, urbanization alternated with deurbanization in waves since the late 17th century, which was due to the relatively weak migration of peasants to cities because it was difficult to change social estates. Active urbanization was hindered by the development of Russia's outskirts, a retarded industrial revolution, and the rural land-reallotting community, which guaranteed a land plot to every worker [13]. In addition, industrialization and urbanization were initially erratic. Industrial enterprises were often located in rural settlements, stimulating the growth of the latter.

The population dynamics in cities of various size and rural settlements from the second half of the 19th

[1] A revised version of the article published in the journal *Regional'nye Issledovaniya*, no. 2, 12–23 (2017).



Fig. 1. Population dynamics in urban and rural settlements of different sizes by periods from 1856 through 2018, % of population in previous period.

For plotting a graph, we had to specify categories of primate, intermediate, and small settlements, different at different times. The average city size in Russia increased during the 19th century from 5000 to 21000 and during the 20th century to 87000–90000 residents. Therefore, a sliding scale was adopted for the intermediate category: 5000–20000 before 1897; 10000–50000 between 1897 and 1926; 20000–100000 between 1926 and 1959; 40000–200000 in 1960s; and 50000–250000 from 1970s. The primate city population of over 250000 corresponds to typical sizes of regional and agglomeration centers in the Russian Federation. The urban population is taken as far as possible within city limits for a given year and not by retrospective calculations, taking into account the latest expansion.

century to present day shown in Fig. 1 gives an idea of the change in urbanization stages.

The waviness of the curves for Russia is associated with the military and political disasters of the 20th century [35]. The first transfer from the initial large-city stage of urbanization, U-I (according to G. Geyer and T. Kontuly [25]), to the more mature second stage, U-II, began after the reforms of the 1860s, when primate and intermediate centers started to grow faster than small centers. During the years of WWI, devastation, and the civil war after the 1917 revolution, the capital cities lost up to an estimated half of their citizens. Small rural and semiurban settlements turned out to be more stable than intermediate ones. That was a crisis counterurbanization (CU). The new wave of U-I stage began in 1926–1939 along with industrialization. The largest centers grew the most quickly. By the 1940s, urbanization passed again into stage U-II, when the intermediate centers caught up with the largest; small cities also grew with the outflow of the rural population coming to these local centers. During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 with its huge number of victims, all the curves turned downward. In the 1950s, the country passed through stage U-I for the third time, after which U-II followed under the quieter late Soviet conditions. After the third "launch," the mature large-city U-II stage lasted for 20–30 years, but the growth of primate cities gradually slowed. In the 1980s and early 1990s, a polarization reversal started, which seemed natural and well timed: medium-sized cities started to outpace the largest, and the outflow of the rural population slowed.

In the early 1990s, political and economic crises, food problems in cities, and hyperinflation caused a migration outflow from primate centers, which was short-lived and not as massive as the prior flight in 1917–1921. The countryside and small cities in European Russia, moreover, started to take in migrants from former Soviet republics and from northern and eastern regions (Fig. 2). The main driver of the shifts was migration; however, its dynamics also depended on natural population decrease, which began on a grand scale from 1992, although it was registered earlier in several places of European Russia, especially in the Non-Chernozem Zone.

A key factor was that hundreds of urban-type settlements transformed administratively into rural settlements, providing their populations with benefits in utility payments, taxes, and sizes of personal land plots around homes.[2] This made such settlements the main shrinking category.

The early 1990s can be considered a transfer to early counterurbanization (CU-V) if we proceed from the formal order of the curves in Fig. 1: the populations of rural areas, as well as of small and intermediate cities, increased most quickly (or decreased most

[2] Many urban-type settlements resembled rural settlements in terms of their outlook and lifestyle: the same village houses with kitchen gardens, often without gas and water supply.



Fig. 2. Net migration to permanent residency in Russian regions on average between 1989 and 1994, migrants per 10000 inhabitants.



Fig. 3. Net migration to permanent residency in Russian regions on average between 2013 and 2016, migrants per 10000 inhabitants.

slowly). True, the countryside and small cities had been poles of attraction for migrants for three to four years against the backdrop of the outflow from large cities and the inflow of repatriates from the CIS countries and from the country's east, especially in 1994 and 1995. These migrations were largely stressful. The repatriates, mainly city dwellers, wanted to move to large cities but went to villages and small cities because they sought shelter, any home—better with a land plot for a start—and they found this in the countryside. There they counted on support from authorities, loans, and free residence in homes abandoned due to rural depopulation. However, many of them began to reach cities for a customary life and easy-to-find employment since the late 1990s.

In the second half of the 1990s, the "pendulum" swung back to the urbanization stage but against the backdrop of decreasing resettlement mobility with partly preserved administrative hurdles and emerging new economic barriers in primate cities. Even more noticeable was the drive toward large cities' environs in the 2000s, primarily closer to Moscow and St. Petersburg (Fig. 3).

Migration data confirm that the 1950s–1970s were a time of a large-scale resettlement of Russia's villagers to the cities, mirroring their outflow from the countryside (Fig. 4). Just like in the first half of the



Fig. 4. Annual migration balance of urban and rural population from 1970 through 2017, thou. people. Source: Rosstat data.



Fig. 5. Total migration balance by urban size category (thou. people) and countryside from 1991 through 2013, annual average for three-year periods, thou. people. Calculated using city profiles and Rosstat data.

century, cities, as adolescents, grew more quickly than they matured, generating many housing and adaptation problems [3, pp. 124–155]. Also cities attracted Russians at the turn to the 21st century, as well as in the 2000s, and the hiatus in the early 1990s was short.

To what extent do the processes under way in Russia correspond to the trends in other post-socialist countries [24]? Whether the small convergence of the migration balance curves of the urban and rural populations in recent years has become a new attempt to switch to reversion (polarization U-turn) as a "normal" evolutionary stage for Russia of the late 20th–early 21st centuries is hard to say. A more detailed analysis of migration balances in settlements of various sizes shows that small cities and especially the countryside in the 2010s lose dramatically to large and largest centers (Fig. 5). Factually, the outflow from the lower settlement levels is even higher than what the statistics on migration to permanent residency shows: millions of labor migrants from the Russian interior, along with those from the CIS countries, settle down in large centers without registration [12, pp. 61–287].

The inflow of temporary migrants to large cities heightens tension there, devastating peripheral territories.

Such unstable dynamics time and again raises the question of the degree of maturity and completeness of

Russian urbanization, the opportunities and times of switching to deurbanization, and the forms, including latent forms, of its national and regional specifics.

Thus, is the urbanization stage in Russia coming to completion, and can we see the real signs of deurbanization that have been observed in Western countries for several decades?

HYPOTHESES EXPLAINING THE SPECIFICS OF RUSSIAN URBANIZATION/DEURBANIZATION

In Figs. 4 and 5, the convergence of the curves under the skyrocketing indicators of the largest centers testifies to the ambiguity of urbanizing trends in post-Soviet Russia. They can be explained by several hypotheses. One is associated with the inadequacy of Russian statistics. The second is associated with the dependence of the conclusion about urbanization/deurbanization on the framework of a territory that is considered urban (urbanized). The third hypothesis explains the fuzziness of observed trends through their diversity and sometimes opposite character in various Russian regions and for various population groups. The strengthening of cyclic recurrent spatial population mobility plays an important role in the 21st century. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis includes the assumption that transfer from provinces to megacities has been replaced with temporal departure for employment to large centers since the 2000s. Finally, the fifth hypothesis states that the mass scale of owners of second rural homes used by city dwellers as dachas during the warm season has created a special type of Russian seasonal–dacha sub- and deurbanization that hinders the deurbanization typical of developed countries. Let us consider each of the five hypotheses.

Inadequate Statistical Accounting of the Population

The latest census of 2010 adjusted the size of Russia's population upward by 1 mln [15]. In addition, the census showed that the urban population was 1.5 mln more and the rural population was 0.5 mln less, demonstrating once again that the current account understates urbanization indicators. The drop in officially registered moves to permanent places of residence in cities from 2000 is partially caused by changes in the rules of accounting for migrants proper: CIS citizens are not registered in the same order as the Russians anymore [14]. The upsurge of migrations in the late 2000s was also due to revision of the rules that classed as migrants all who came to stay for nine months or more [21]. Therefore, temporary Russian and foreign labor migrants registered for these periods regardless of their permanent residence began to overstate urban population indicators.

The Problem of the Limits of Cities and Urbanized Zones

Obviously, judgements of the prevalence of urbanization, suburbanization, or deurbanization processes depend (sometimes decisively) on territories classified as city, suburb, agglomeration, or larger formation of a megalopolis type or urban region. Their sizes vary by country and place. One example is the urban district of Sochi with its area of 3500 km^2 and 147 km extent along the sea; another is Novosibirsk, whose population is 3.3 times larger, area is 7 times smaller, and maximum diameter is 45 km.

Some cities spread their boundaries following expansion of developments or for future development; others do not touch them from a point in time, assuming that they will never catch up with the real urban sprawl. A stark example is the official Paris *intra muros* (Inner Paris), occupying 105 km^2 and populated at night, i.e., conditionally permanently, by some two million Parisians. Even the famous business Défense (the Parisian counterpart of Manhattan, Pudong or the City of London) formally belongs to the Hauts-de-Seine suburban department. Of course, the French capital is larger, and 10–12 mln people live there, depending on the composition of the Métropole du Grand Paris, its agglomeration, and region.

All of this is directly related to the trends that we are trying to clarify. If we expand the understanding of the urban environment to R. Florida's urbanized habitats, belts, and megaregions [20], identified and termed differently but always uniting zones of contiguous agglomerations (100000 km^2 or more) with tens and even hundreds of millions of inhabitants (e.g., the Yangtze River Delta), many countries would not speak about deurbanization, and vice versa.

The Moscow city limits have expanded every 25–30 years: in 1931, 1960, 1984–1985, and 2012. Both authors of this article were born within Old Moscow and at school age moved with their parents to new apartment buildings in the then outskirts of the capital. If the city limit had not changed in the 20th century, we, living 8 km away from the Kremlin, would have exemplified suburbanization and commuting from the suburb, working in Moscow's historical center. Now, after the dramatic expansion of the Moscow city limits to Kaluga oblast, stretching it to more then 90 km, our location looks intraurban.

This interpretation of processes depending on the composition of urban systematics used as a basis makes the very qualification and periodization of these processes doubtful. For example, after the 1970 census, which showed an outflow of people from cities (as such, within their official limits) in the United States, scientists there started speaking about counter- or deurbanization. However, it can also be considered a continuation of urbanization with a broader base and in new forms, blurring the boundaries between urban and rural settlement pattern.

The novelty of forms, the size of territories, and the direction of movement—toward and away from the center—seem to clarify the pattern of the stages. However, this is not quite the case. Their characteristics often lack clear-cut criteria and reliable data. Centripetal and centrifugal migrations routinely coexist, side by side in one place.

Regional Diversity of Migration Processes

Analysis of population dynamics and migration balance between the two last censuses showed that the suburbs of large cities in the 2000s grew faster than the centers themselves, even when the city limits expanded [16]. On a local scale, these are characteristics of suburbanization. However, centers together with suburbs draw so much of the population from other Russian territories that they have become sort of united centers within not only regional but also interregional urbanization.

The leader here is Moscow oblast. Statistically, satellite and in situ images show how Moscow oblast has been built up, including the second homes of Muscovites and near-Moscow townspeople, including many comfortable mansions. The oblast has occupied first place in Russia for new housing supply since 2004, outpacing Moscow [23]. There are over 1000 luxury "cottage" villages here, and another 400 are under construction [31]. Every year, houses in old dacha and gardeners's communities are being rebuilt and used with increasing frequency in the cold months. However, can we consider this a characteristic of deurbanization? According to the Internet magazine *Metrinfo*, 90% of Muscovites answered no to the question whether they were ready to exchange their apartment in Moscow for a larger residential place in Moscow's suburbs [1]. It is cheaper for Muscovites to buy housing, most often, high-rise apartments, in Moscow oblast than in the capital; this is either a purchase out of necessity (in the absence of one's own housing or when families separate) or an investment by well-to-do people in a second residence (while retaining the apartment in Moscow). Moreover, the cities and rural districts of Moscow oblast that border Moscow are often built up with blocks of high-rise buildings, most of which are bought out by the dwellers in Moscow's suburbs themselves. Over 40% of housing in Moscow oblast is bought by migrants from other Russian regions. Financial inaccessibility of Moscow housing for most Russians forces those who want to work in the capital or closer to it move to Moscow oblast. According to Rosstat data, Moscow and Moscow oblast have annually increased their populations by 100000 people each on average between 2013 and 2017 owing to migrations, attracting people from many regions of the country.

The suburbs of regional capitals are growing, which scholars often tend to explain by entry migration from small cities and villages of their region, as well as from neighboring countries, primarily former Soviet republics. Thus, A.Yu. Kazakova considers Kaluga's suburbs an "adaptation site" for those who are anxious to live in Kaluga [8] and probably in Moscow, since Kaluga oblast borders Moscow in its new limits. In summer, the share of the autochthonous suburban population here is no greater than one-third; another third consists of newcomers from afar; the rest are dacha residents, moreover middle-class Kalugans unwilling to move to the suburbs for permanent residency, among other things, due to the worst social environment. At the same time, the entire north of the oblast outside of Kaluga's suburbs serves as a popular dacha area for Muscovites.

In recent years, the population of Stavropol krai has only increased in Stavropol, its twin city of Mikhailovsk, and the agglomeration of the city of Mineralnye Vody in the Caucasus [12, pp. 375–380], mainly owing to migrations from rural areas and small cities. Even migrants settling in remote districts of the krai under government resettlement programs have ended up moving closer to centers.

The rapid growth of suburbs in Russia may be attributed, in particular, to the stage of active urbanization. For example, in Eastern Siberia, around Ulan-Ude, the capital of Buryatia, the former gardeners' partnerships of city dwellers now look like overgrown settlements where rural inhabitants from remote places in Buryatia have moved and permanently reside. Most of them commute to the city for work. Also typical is squatting on land plots in the suburbs and mostly rural and unauthorized buildings of various styles. A.S. Breslavskii [2] sees the reasons for their growth in the republic's settlement pattern with its small and sparse cities and the dominance of Ulan-Ude. All of Breslavskii's data confirm that the sources of the formation of this belt are still the spontaneous irrevocable migration of rural dwellers closer to the city and much more rarely the deurbanization Ulan-Udeans who have no monetary means to improve their housing conditions in the city.

In most eastern Russian regions, only their centers are attractive for resettlement and work, and they draw people in. Nevertheless, research shows that suburbs around old Siberian capitals, such as Omsk or Irkutsk, are turning nonuniformly, bit-by-bit, into a relatively comfortable residence zone for well-to-do citizens [5]. One way or another, much depends on the urbanistic maturity of regions: the presence or absence of an undepleted peripheral–rural and semiurban "reservoir" there.

Labor Migrations As a Type of Cyclic Recurrent Spatial Mobility of People

Since the 2000s, the economic ramp-up in urban centers has expanded the range of jobs there, while jobs still remain scarce in many regions. The demand

for unskilled labor has made many jobs in large cities accessible to crowds from small cities and rural communities. Such people took these jobs up for a living, often losing their professional qualifications and forgetting their education and ambitions [17]. In addition, housing price hikes in megacities made Russians forego taking up permanent residence there for temporary labor migration (*otkhodnichestvo*). Provincials leave their homes and families to live and work in large cities for some time. This hinders official urbanization. In fact, many live between two homes: two weeks or a month at work in the city and the same amount of time at home in the village. Nevertheless, up to 40% Russian labor migrants would like to move to a large city for good, and ultimately some of them fulfill this desire, prolonging urbanization in doing so [12, pp. 83–102]. Some migrant workers (*otkhodniki*) live for years in large cities, preserving their rural residence registrations.

It is no exaggeration to say that urbanization in Russia is supported by increasing economic centralization along with the contrast between large centers and the most part of the rest territory. The smaller the settlement, the higher the probability of its sociodemographic depression, other things being equal, and the larger the relative losses of the population during the outflow and depopulation [36]. As for depressed cities, several factors (the failure of city-forming enterprises, unemployment among able-bodied citizens, low labor compensations or their absence, etc.) in the early 2010s characterized two-thirds of small cities and one-fifth of medium cities as depressed. This mostly explains the large number of people who want to leave them for "rich" centers both in search of jobs and for resettlement (Fig. 6).

Polarization of the countryside and the agrarian economy have also resulted in the stratification of regions, on the one hand, into successful southern and suburban, with powerful agroholding companies, private farms, and, on the other, into depressed ones, with abandoned fields and high unemployment rates [33]. However, modernization of agricultural production in the south has also led to a bad drop in employment and has revealed surplus rural populations, which has increased outflow to cities.

The difference in earnings between large centers and peripheries is a major factor of labor migrations. Thus, a survey of territories between Moscow and St. Petersburg has revealed three- to fourfold gradients in average labor compensations by municipality in near-capital oblasts (even without the capitals themselves) and outside of them [18]. The strongest drop is seen in agricultural wage (being almost 100% of the Russian average in the 1980s, it hardly reached 50% by 2015). Now rural inhabitants need large centers not to buy scarce goods, including food, like it used to be in Soviet times, but for a living. The aging of the population, the absence of the former kolkhoz assistance,



Fig. 6. Net migration per 1000 residents in cities with different levels of socioeconomic well-being between 2010 and 2013 (from 1, most unfavorable, to 5, most favorable). Calculated by authors from city profiles.

and the weakness of small rural businesses due to various barriers also constrict subsidiary household farms and force people from the countryside and small settlements to move to large cities in search of off-the-books jobs, even in the shadow economy.

Thus, widespread labor migrations and the unaccounted-for temporary population of large centers favored more active actual urbanization than visible statistical urbanization. However, as long as these are temporary labor migrations, they do not affect families, although they represent a step for the entire family to move to the city. Thus, labor migrations (*otkhodnichestvo*) may be considered, to some extent, eventual urbanization.

Specifics of Dacha Suburbanization and Deurbanization

Western-type suburbanization with people resettling from large cities to the suburbs, complemented by labor supply and infrastructural development, is still weakly expressed in Russia. Creeping development around Moscow would seem to suggest the opposite [32]. Muscovites can indeed settle new suburbs on a permanent basis. However, it is difficult to call the purchase of housing outside the city limits in high-rise or lower residential areas "classical suburbanization." These areas, even surrounded by rural and semirural landscapes, look more like bedroom outskirts of the megalopolis. Construction sites near Moscow attract foreign and Russian workers, who partly settle in the city or in the suburbs sooner or later. Cheaper apartments in districts nearest to cities and easily accessible by transport are very attractive to such migrants. Overall, such growth of suburbia somewhat increases urbanization.

Another point is the construction or purchase of suburban second homes, i.e. seasonal dachas. The departure of millions from the city to the suburbs, as well as to distant rural districts, is very typical of Russia. The lack of space in urban apartments and, at the same time, the fear of losing them spur city dwellers to



Fig. 7. Average-size dacha settlement lacking special municipal status in comparison with average-size rural settlement by selected region, people.

live between two homes: in the city and at the dacha. Such a life motivated recreationally, environmentally, economically (investment and subsidiary farming), and demographically (with a view to age, suburban relaxation for grandchildren, etc.). It depends on season and day of the week. In many regions, especially in southern ones, second homes of city dwellers in gardeners' partnerships are located within the city limits, on the outskirts. Such an urban dacha is a convenient supplement to the apartment.

Dachas have long become Russia's social brand. Research into them dates back to the Soviet era [19], but broad interest in dachas and the dacha way of life as a national phenomenon is young [4, 12, 34, 40]. In the West, studies on this topic, often called "second home tourism," appeared earlier [37, 38, etc.]. At the same time, Russia, as well as the Soviet Union, has been and still is the world's dacha champion in absolute and relative (per capita) indicators.

Seasonal climate contrasts, insufficiency of the suburban infrastructure, and the shortage of monetary means to equip a dacha with amenities for winter living have created the practice of dacha suburbanization and deurbanization in Russia, which is different from that in the West. Even if a house is quite suitable for year-round living, it is often used as an additional second home or as a dwelling place for part of the family with constant shuttling between dacha and city. Most dacha places are characterized by predominantly seasonal occupancy.

Summer deurbanization was typical of the nobility in the 19th and 20th centuries, as well as of the middle-class urban strata in the early 20th century, when classical urbanization was gaining momentum. Back then the summer departure of Muscovites and Petersburgers to dachas, made easier by the construction of railroads, became very popular [18]. Dacha zones spread far beyond the capitals and their suburbs (to Valdai, for example). However, there was no such dacha density as we see today.

During the Soviet Union's rapid urbanization, the dacha boom was caused, first, by the policy of encouraging elites and then by providing citizens with the opportunity of supplementing themselves with vegetables, fruit, and berries on these small plots in gardeners' partnerships. Now horticultural plots around cities with small houses constitute the most widespread type of dacha suburbanization, totaling 14 million. Together with old dachas, new suburban villas, housing estates in domestic and foreign resorts, and inherited or purchased rural homes, these total at least 17–20 mln, or half of urban families. Dachas have long spread far beyond suburbs. The farther they are, the less regular but often longer the residence time in them. Suburban dachas, even not quite well furnished, can function as primate housing when an urban apartment is left to children or rented out for extra income.

All of this allows us to speak about a special type of Russian dacha deurbanization. However, it is very hard to define its scale due to the lack of any complete official data. Therefore, the study of dacha lifestyles, distinguishing dachas that have become more or less permanent habitats from those typically visited on weekends or vacations, requires laborious local surveys on vast territories.

An alternative network of temporary inhabited dacha settlements is very nonuniform and gravitates toward large cities, transport arteries, and partially better natural landscapes [11]. Garden and dacha areas, deprived of their own municipal status, often invisible on maps, and more populated in summer than the surrounding villages (Fig. 7), have de facto

transformed the settlement pattern. Away from cities and resort zones, there are networks of dacha villages whose summer urban population is far larger than the official permanent rural one, but ignored by the systems of transportation, garbage collection, medical care, etc.

What is the degree of real deurbanization of the dacha population? This is a difficult question, which requires mass polling. Near Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other large cities, dachas feature a diversity of housing (from palaces to shacks) and dacha dwellers, as well as isolation by high fences, although altogether these are almost large low-rise pseudocities. This suburbanization pushes out of the city not so much its permanent population as its capital. Over three million Muscovites in Moscow oblast have dachas, which increase the oblast population in summer by about 60%, and the rural population by two to three times. Moscow oblast is the first in Russia to dwell those who stay at their dachas all year round or most of the year. Every sixth dacha is suitable for permanent residence, although this is less frequent in practice.

Semi-remote dachas (up to 250–300 km away), which take about 3 h to reach, less often serve as strongholds of complete deurbanization due to the impossibility of frequently commuting to the "home" city. An exception is cottage estates in the most attractive places on the Volga and the Oka rivers, as well as on some lakes. In such landscapes, houses in gardeners' partnerships also look wealthier: initially, land plots were allocated to the populations of oblast and district centers, and then Muscovites repurchased them. In summer, dacha dwellers increase the population of some districts by several times, especially those adjoining the outer borders of Moscow oblast. In addition to seasonal downshifting to avoid anxieties, stress, and the heat of the megacity for a while. The craving for dacha life stems from generational differences: aged people and their grandchildren are often ready to spend much time far away in a natural setting.

Remote dachas also exist; normally rural homes bought by inhabitants of large cities, they are located 300–700 km or farther from them. Complete deurbanization on this basis is not typical of Muscovites or St. Petersburg rivers, although the Internet is full of such advertisements. Only few enthusiasts of country life or city dwellers with a penchant for farming belong here. Most of them keep their residency and homes in the city. A survey of dacha dwellers in the interior of Kostroma oblast showed that 85% of these are Muscovites. Almost half of the respondents did not answer the question "Would you like to live permanently at the dacha?"; one-third were strictly negative; the rest were ready to move if it were not for deurbanization barriers. In addition to the distance from Moscow (600 km) and from the district center (35 km), they saw such barriers as the lack of roads; the absence of public transit systems that reach villages, pipeline gas, and water supply; and unreliable communications (Internet), trade, services, medical care, and schools [12, p. 417]. This set of factors is very typical of peripheral districts far from centers in the Non-Chernozem Zone.

Potential resettlers from the city usually hope to improve quality of life, which they associate with rural style, peace, and nature [7]. However, problems of real deurbanization are stem from the fact that it is hard for city dwellers to fit into the local community. Their attempts to start their own businesses more often rest on dacha (i.e. urban) communities than on local connections. Urban youth actively discussing this topic in social networks are not ready to move to the rural "wilderness".

Dachas and dacha dwellers can only conventionally be considered a basis of eventual deurbanization, just like seasonal labor as a basis for urbanization. The question arises: which basis or potential is broader and more powerful? Assessments vary very much in both cases. If we take most probable moderate assessments, 5 to 6 mln seasonal workers and 15–20 mln dacha owners, with their equal family members, this will give a triple advantage to the deurbanization potential. The realization of either potential can differ in different regions.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

All five hypotheses explaining the strange behavior of the curves qualified to specify the place of contemporary Russia on the scale of stages of differential urbanization and to explain its nonstandard dynamics are in a sense reasonable. However, they treat various properties and indicators of the process in different planes, and none of them can be considered a priority under the current level of knowledge and available information. Incidentally, other hypotheses are possible: sixth, seventh, etc., all the way to complaints about the initial theoretical scheme, which is too universal and ignores the diversity of national, regional, and local options, as well as "geography" in general.

Russia's specifics are perhaps the most vivid in three respects.

First, urbanization at early stages is susceptible to sharp fluctuations against the backdrop of crises, especially in the first half of the 20th century.

Second, the resettlement counterurbanization (and its suburban incarnation, suburbanization) is replaced with dacha-seasonal, temporary-recurrent forms that is typical of Russia. They are usually overlooked by urbanism theorists, although interest in this and other types of spatial mobility is there and growing. This partly refers to "urbanistic" seasonal labor of the Russian population, although it gives way to dacha "deurbanistic" migrations in large-scale involvement inside the country. It definitely does not refer to labor

commuting flows: they are more powerful in many countries.

Third, it is hard to dispel doubts using available statistical database that does not adequately reflect the complexity of present-day movements and shifts in the country. It often prevents attempts to shed light on the real population dynamics and the exchange of populations between cities, suburbs, and remote countryside.

As for regional variations in urbanization/deurbanization, as well as the dependence of their assessments on the borders and sizes of territorial units, these problems are universal and typical at least of all large countries in the world. Each place and type of community or environment gives what it can and cannot furnish an idyll. It is important that their diversity be preserved, and that a person has a choice, depending on his/her tastes, profession, prosperity, domesticity, and age.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The first part of this article "Urbanization in Russia in the 20th Century" was written by T.G. Nefedova and supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 17-06-00396. The second part "Hypotheses Explaining the Specifics of Russian Urbanization/Deurbanization" was written by A.I. Treivish within the scope of the state-ordered research theme of the Institute of Geography, RAS, no. 0148-2019-0008.

REFERENCES

1. Escape behind the Moscow Ring Road, 2015. https://riamo.ru/article/50082/begstvo-za-mkad-utopiya-ili-spasenie.xl. Accessed May 5, 2017.
2. Breslavskii, A.S., *Nezaplanirovannye prigorody: sel'skogorodskaya migratsiya i rost Ulan-Ude v postsovetskii period* (Non-Planned Suburbs: Rural–Urban Migration and Extension of Ulan-Ude in Post-Soviet Period), Ulan-Ude: Buryat. Nauch. Tsentr, Sib. Otd., Ross. Akad. Nauk, 2014.
3. *Gorod i derevnya v Evropeiskoi Rossii: sto let peremen*. (The Town and the Country in European Russia: Hundred Years of Change), Nefedova, T.G., Polyan, P.M., and Treivish, A.I., Eds., Moscow: Ob"ed. Gumanit. Izd., 2001.
4. *Gorozhane v derevne. Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya v rossiiskoi glubinke: dezurbanizatsiya i sel'sko-gorodskie soobshchestva* (Townspeople in the Village. Sociological Research in the Russian Province: Deurbanization and Rural-Urban Communities), Il'in, V.I. and Pokrovskii, N.E., Eds., Moscow: Universitetskaya Kniga, 2016.
5. Grigorichev, K.V., Suburbanism in Siberian regions as a mechanism of post-Soviet transformations, in *Chto my znaem o rossiiskikh prigorodakh?* (What do We Know about Russian Suburbs?), Ulan-Ude: Buryat. Nauch. Tsentra, Sib. Otd., Ross. Akad. Nauk, 2017, pp. 74–87.
6. Zaionchkovskaya, Zh.A., *Demograficheskaya situatsiya i rasselenie* (Demographic Situation and Settlement Pattern), Moscow: Nauka, 1991.
7. Zvyagintsev, V.I. and Neuvazhaeva, M.A., Migrants to the countryside: the phenomenon of "reverse migration" in modern Russia, *Mir Ross.*, 2015, no. 1, pp. 101–135.
8. Kazakova, A.Yu., Kaluga suburban area: settlement system, types of inhabitants and variants of suburbanism, in *Chto my znaem o rossiiskikh prigorodakh?* (What do We Know about Russian Suburbs?), Ulan-Ude: Buryat. Nauch. Tsentra, Sib. Otd., Ross. Akad. Nauk, 2017, pp. 87–98.
9. Kummel, T., The stadial concept of urbanization: methodology and methods of analysis, in *Metody izucheniya rasseleniya* (Methods of Settlement pattern Studies), Moscow: Inst. Geogr., Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1987, pp. 82–100.
10. Lappo, G.M., *Geografiya gorodov* (Geography of Cities), Moscow: VLADOS, 1997.
11. Makhrova, A. G., Medvedev, A.A., and Nefedova, T.G., Garden and dacha settlements of the townspeople in the system of rural settlement pattern, *Vestn. Mosk. Univ., Ser. 5: Geogr.*, 2016, no. 2, pp. 64–74 .
12. *Mezhdu domom i ... domom. Vozvratnaya prostranstvennaya mobil'nost' naseleniya Rossii* (Between Home and .... Home. The Return Spatial Mobility of Population in Russia), Nefedova, T.G., Averkieva, K.V., and Makhrova, A.G., Eds., Moscow: Novyi Khronograf, 2016. http://ekonom.igras.ru/data/bhah2016.pdf.
13. Mironov, B.N., *Rossiiskaya imperiya: ot traditsii k modernu* (Russian Empire: From Tradition to Modernity), St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2014, vol. 1, pp. 839–845.
14. Mkrtchyan, N.V., Migration balance of Russian cities: the influence of the size and position in the system of center-peripheral relations, in *Nauchnye trudy Instituta narodokhozyaistvennogo prognozirovaniya RAN* (Scientific Transactions of the Institute of Economic Forecasting, Russian Academy of Sciences), Korovkin, A.G., Ed., Moscow: MAKS Press, 2011, pp. 416–430.
15. Mkrtchyan, N.V., Problems of registration of the population of certain age groups during the 2010 census: reasons for deviations of obtained data from the expected, *Demoscope Weekly*, 2014, nos. 581–582.
16. Mkrtchyan, N.V., Near-capital territories of Russia: population dynamics and migration balance, in *Chto my znaem o rossiiskikh prigorodakh?* (What do We Know about Russian Suburbs?), Ulan-Ude: Buryat. Nauch. Tsentra, Sib. Otd., Ross. Akad. Nauk, 2017, pp. 26–37.
17. Plyusnin, Yu.M., Zausaeva, Ya.D., Zhidkevich, N.N., and Pozanenko, A.A., *Otkhodniki* (Seasonal Migrants), Moscow: Novyi Khronograf, 2013.
18. *Puteshestvie iz Peterburga v Moskvu: 222 goda spustya. Kniga 1. Dva stoletiya rossiiskoi istorii mezhdu Moskvoi i Sankt-Peterburgom* (Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow: 222 Years After, Book 1: Two Centuries of Russian History between Moscow and St. Petersburg), Nefedova, T.G. and Treivish, A.I., Eds., Moscow: URSS-Lenand, 2015.

19. *Territorial'naya organizatsiya otdykha naseleniya Moskvy i Moskovskoi oblasti* (Territorial Organization of the Recreation of Population of Moscow and Moscow Oblast), Preobrazhenskii, V.S., Ed., Moscow: Nauka, 1986.
20. Florida, R., *Who's Your City? How the Creative Economy Is Making Where You Live the Most Important Decision of Your Life*, New York: Basic Books, 2008.
21. Florinskaya, Yu.F., Mkrtchyan, N.V., Maleva, T.M., and Kirillova, M.K., *Migratsiya i rynok truda. Analiticheskii doklad* (Migration and Labor Market: Analytical Report), Moscow: Delo, 2015.
22. Berry, B., The counterurbanization process: urban America since 1970, in *Urbanization and Counterurbanization*, Beverly Hills, Ca: Sage, 1976, pp. 17–30.
23. Brade, I., Makhrova, A., and Nefedova, T., Suburbanization of Moscow's urban region, in *Confronting Suburbanization. Urban Decentralization in Postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe*, Stanilov, K. and Sykora, L., Eds., New York: Wiley, 2014, pp. 97–133.
24. *Confronting Suburbanization. Urban Decentralization in Postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe*, Stanilov, K. and Sykora, L., Eds., New York: Wiley, 2014
25. Geyer, Y.S. and Kontuly, T., The Theoretical Foundation of the Concept of Differential Urbanization, *Int. Reg. Sci. Rev.*, 1993, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 157–177.
26. Gibbs, J., The evolution of population concentration, *Econ. Geogr.*, 1963, vol. 2, pp. 119–129.
27. Gritsay, O. and Treivish, A., Stadial concept of regional development: the dynamics of core and periphery, *Geogr. Z.*, 1990, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 65–77.
28. Hall, P. and Hay, D., *Growth Centers in the European Urban System*, London: Heinemann, 1980.
29. Fielding, A., Migration and counterurbanization in Western Europe since 1950, *Geogr. J.*, 1989, vol. 155, p. 62.
30. Friedmann, J., *Regional Development Policy. A Case Study of Venezuela*, Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 1966.
31. Makhrova, A.G. and Kirillov, P.L., Seasonal pulsation of settlement pattern in the Moscow agglomeration under the influence of dacha and work commuting: approaches to studies and assessment, *Reg. Res. Russ.*, 2016, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 1–8.
32. Makhrova, A.G., Nefedova, T.G., and Treivish, A.I., Moscow agglomeration and "New Moscow": The capital city-region case of Russia's urbanization, *Reg. Res. Russ.*, 2013, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 131–141.
33. Nefedova, T.G., Major trends for changes in the socio-economic space of rural Russia, *Reg. Res. Russ.*, 2012, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 41–54.
34. Nefedova, T. and Pallot, J., The multiplicity of second home development in the Russian Federation: A case of "seasonal suburbanization"? in *Second Home Tourism in Europe: Lifestyle Issues and Policy Responses*, Roca, Z., Ed., Farnham: Ashgate, 2013, pp. 91–121
35. Nefedova, T.G. and Treivish, A.I., Differential Urbanisation in Russia, *Tijdschr. Econ. Soc. Geogr.*, 2003, vol. 94, no. 1, pp. 75–88.
36. Nefedova, T.G., Slepukhina, I.L., and Brade, I., Migration attractiveness of cities in the post-Soviet space, *Reg. Res. Russ.*, 2016, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 27–38
37. *Second Homes: Curse or Blessing?* Coppock, J.T., Ed., Oxford: Pergamon, 1977.
38. *Second Home Tourism in Europe: Lifestyle Issues and Policy Responses*, Roca, Z., Ed., Farnham: Ashgate, 2013.
39. Richardson, H.W., Polarization reversal in developing countries, *Pap. Reg. Sci.*, 1980, vol. 45, pp. 67–85.
40. Treivish, A.I., "Dacha Studies" as the Science on Second Homes in the West and in Russia, *Reg. Res. Russ.*, 2014, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 179–188.

Translated by B. Alekseev